The significance of consequence assessment applied to the risk based approach of homeland security by Proctor, Richard B.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2008-03
The significance of consequence assessment
applied to the risk based approach of homeland security
Proctor, Richard B.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT 









 Thesis Advisor:  Robert Bach 
 Second Reader: Michael Chumer 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
March 2008 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Significance of Consequence 
Assessment Applied to the Risk Based Approach of Homeland 
Security 
6. AUTHOR(S) Richard B. Proctor 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER   
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
  AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
The purpose of this thesis is to challenge the risk based approach of homeland security practice to 
elevate the significance of consequence during the Homeland Security risk assessment process. The 
consequence variable must be afforded an equal to or greater value similar to threat and vulnerability. In 
doing so, local homeland security policies can be focused towards consequence mitigation when planning 
and determining how to reduce risk within a designated jurisdiction.  
Today’s emergency preparedness risk environment has become increasingly more severe and 
complex, especially at the local level. The management of that risk is a fundamental requirement of local 
government which is expected to identify and anticipate areas of vulnerability and set in place a cohesive 
strategy across all disciplines to mitigate, reduce and eliminate these risks.  The problem with this 
expectation is that federal guidance documents have a deliberate bias toward short term objectives which 
undermines a local government’s long term commitment to the people it serves. Local agencies must be 
able to respond to emergencies in a way that minimizes the number of casualties or injuries during an 
incident that threatens members of their community and maintains services until the situation returns to 
normal.  
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
91 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Consequences, Consequence Assessment, Culture of Preparedness, 
Preparedness, Resilience, Risk, Risk Management, Threat, Vulnerability 

















Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT APPLIED TO THE 
RISK BASED APPROACH OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
 
 
Richard B. Proctor 
Civilian, Health Officer  
B.A., Washington and Lee University, 1972 
M.S., New Jersey Institute of Technology, 1997 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 

























Harold A. Trinkunas 
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to challenge the risk based approach of 
homeland security practice to elevate the significance of consequence during the 
Homeland Security risk assessment process. The consequence variable must be 
afforded an equal to or greater value similar to threat and vulnerability. In doing 
so, local homeland security policies can be focused towards consequence 
mitigation when planning and determining how to reduce risk within a designated 
jurisdiction.  
Today’s emergency preparedness risk environment has become 
increasingly more severe and complex, especially at the local level. The 
management of that risk is a fundamental requirement of local government which 
is expected to identify and anticipate areas of vulnerability and set in place a 
cohesive strategy across all disciplines to mitigate, reduce and eliminate these 
risks. The problem with this expectation is that federal guidance documents have 
a deliberate bias toward short term objectives which undermines a local 
government’s long term commitment to the people it serves. Local agencies must 
be able to respond to emergencies in a way that minimizes the number of 
casualties or injuries during an incident that threatens members of their 
community and maintains services until the situation returns to normal.  
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
It's totally wiped out. ... It's devastating; it's got to be doubly 
devastating on the ground. 
–President Bush, turning to his aides while surveying 
Hurricane Katrina flood damage from Air Force One, 
August 31, 2005 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to challenge the risk-based approach of 
homeland security practice and to elevate the significance of consequence 
during the Homeland Security risk assessment process. The consequence 
variable must be afforded a value equal to or greater than threat and 
vulnerability. In doing so, local homeland security policies can be focused 
towards consequence mitigation when planning and determining how to reduce 
risk within a designated jurisdiction.  
Today’s emergency preparedness risk environment has become 
increasingly severe and complex, especially at the local level. The management 
of that risk is a fundamental requirement of local government, which is expected 
to identify and anticipate areas of vulnerability, and set in place a cohesive 
strategy across all disciplines to mitigate, reduce and eliminate these risks. The 
problem with this expectation is that the same federal guidance documents are 
being used at the federal, state and local level as officials embark on similar, but 
very different, homeland security missions. A review of these documents will 
reveal a deliberate bias toward short-term objectives which undermines a local 
government’s long term commitment to the people it serves. Local agencies must 
be able to respond to emergencies in a way that minimizes the number of 
casualties or injuries during an incident that threatens members of their 
community, and maintain services until the situation returns to normal.   
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Various emergency response disciplines interpret the numerous 
Homeland Security federal guidance documents in different ways in order to craft 
a plan to protect the public. In April 2005, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) adopted a risk-based approach allocating Homeland Security (HLS) 
funding in identifying critical infrastructure. The problem with the approach is that 
local agencies are overwhelmed and intimidated in their preparedness efforts 
when identifying how and which elements of critical infrastructure within their 
communities to protect. Another problem with the approach is that, as local 
homeland security funding is allocated, vulnerability and threat factors far 
outweigh the significance of consequence when assessing the risk. If we as first 
responders ignore lessons learned, either from consequence assessments, 
scenario exercises or real time events, the public will lose trust and question our 
continued existence. New Orleans is a perfect example, because the probable 
consequences of a catastrophic hurricane were well known to emergency 
response planners, yet they failed to prepare.  
Homeland Security grant funds – specifically related to the Homeland 
Security Grant Program (HSGP) and Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) – 
add to these problems because they are utilized for defensive measures. When 
disbursed to local agencies, the resulting funded programs tend to protect 
various targets perceived locally as valuable but which may be less significant 
from a broader national or cross-jurisdictional perspective. For example, the 
decentralized strategy has local governments often attempting to defend 
individual assets within a strongly networked critical infrastructure. As a result, 
federal grant dollars are encouraging local governments to spend in areas that 
represent the least effective strategy and which may even be counterproductive 
to the homeland security mission. Contributing to problems related to the 
allocation of funds is the problem that local governments have in managing 
grants using the current risk based approach in community preparedness efforts.   
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The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) best defines Risk as “a 
function of consequence, vulnerability, and threat: R = f (C, V, T).”1 In this 
equation R = Risk, C = Consequence, V = Vulnerability and T = Threat. Despite 
the vagueness of the risk based approach concept, policy makers and 
stakeholders in every state and local jurisdiction in this country are expected to 
conform to federal guidance documents and utilize the risk assessment formula 
as fundamental in their preparedness efforts to prevent, respond to and recover 
from a possible attack or natural disaster. The approach is based on three 
criteria: 1) threat assessment, 2) vulnerability of a target and 3) consequence of a 
terrorist attack. According to the 2007 DHS Risk Assessment Methodology for 
the UASI Region, there is heightened priority and focus of threat and vulnerability 
when assessing and interpreting risk. Consequence, as identified in the same 
matrix, is not considered equally and is under represented in the risk analysis 
process. Locally, we cannot calculate and then act upon those calculations of risk 
unless and until we have a thorough understanding and awareness in measuring 
the impact of consequence. Local and state governments are probably best 
suited to calculate consequence in their area because of their extensive local 
situational awareness and boots on the ground expertise.   
The consequence variable must be evaluated independently of threat and 
vulnerability. Currently, it is not. The result has a negative impact during the 
planning process because factors such as demographics, economics and social 
issues will be ignored, which prevents a complete and thorough consequence 
assessment. Without completely assessing the economic, human, housing and 
social costs of an attack or natural disaster, there is no way to accurately 
measure whether or not HLS efforts have reduced risk. Therefore, in order to 
plan, prepare and balance vulnerability and threat reduction with effective 
consequence reduction, it is important that local stakeholders have a thorough 
                                            
1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2006), 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dhs/nps23-062906-
01.pdf&code=80382dac961e832159cc3488e6d9f002 (accessed March 13, 2008), 35. 
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understanding of the full extent of the consequences. If used properly, an 
effective preparedness strategy can then be determined, and the ability to build a 
resilient community will be strengthened. 
B. IS IT POSSIBLE TO PROTECT OUR HOMELAND?  
The purpose of the National Strategy for Homeland Security is to guide 
and unify the country’s efforts to achieve four goals: 1) Prevent and disrupt 
terrorist attacks; 2) Protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and 
key resources;  3) Respond to and recover from incidents that do occur; and, 4) 
Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long-term success.2  
DHS further stresses “our first and most solemn obligation is to protect the 
American people. The National Strategy for Homeland Security will guide our 
Nation as we honor this commitment and achieve a more secure Homeland that 
sustains our way of life as a free, prosperous, and welcoming America.”3  
Accomplishing this massive task requires homeland protection to utilize 
various methods such as prevention, defense, mitigation, or enhanced response 
capability. In each method, risk reduction is accomplished by applying a different 
approach and acting on a different set of variables. Threat reduction, for 
example, requires investment in preventive methods such as added intelligence 
gathering and surveillance. The problem is that most local governments have 
limited access to federal intelligence sources and minimal terrorist intelligence 
gathering capability. Vulnerability reduction involves denying access to targets 
through target hardening or denying access to the means to launch an attack. 
Here the problem is that vulnerability reduction is target specific, yielding only 
incremental improvements in security. Consequence reduction is accomplished 
by providing redundant systems or enhanced planning and preparedness. The 
                                            
2 U.S. Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, 
DC: The White House, 2007), http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf 
(accessed March 17, 2008), 1. 
3 Ibid. 
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advantage gained utilizing a consequence assessment method is the ability to 
apply an all-hazards framework. One can determine that a complete risk based 
approach requires an individual assessment of all three variables – threat, 
vulnerability and consequence when assessing the risk at the local level.    
 For example, Lewis points out that “one of the most fundamental 
assumptions made regarding the national strategy is that critical infrastructure 
protection is the responsibility of state and local government.”4 Therefore, local 
governments face a unique challenge in hometown security because limited 
manpower, minimal financial resources and a lack of expertise necessary in 
defending against a global terrorist threat are ongoing concerns impacting small 
town planning. With an abundance of potential terrorist targets across the nation, 
the threat is diluted and an “it can’t happen here” attitude is developed. This 
attitude effectively reduces the priority of HLS concerns among local policy 
makers across the country because preparedness is not taken seriously. 
Complacency is already developing at the local level.   
There continues to be an assumption shared by policy makers and DHS 
that local agencies can handle the monumental tasks of protecting each and 
every infrastructure component. Money cannot resolve the issue of preventing an 
attack, but because the risk based formula is not being used uniformly across 
each state, limited guidance has allowed agencies to spend as they deem 
appropriate--resulting at times in unnecessary, laughable and embarrassing 
purchases and procedures as states prioritize among identified risks and allocate 
their homeland security funds. Examples of unnecessary spending include the 
purchase of an air-conditioned garbage truck, segways, health club 
memberships, etc. The point is, spending grant dollars on items such as these 
items reduce our capacity in the mission to protect our homeland.   
                                            
4 Ted G. Lewis and Rudy Darken, "Potholes and Detours in the Road to Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Policy," Homeland Security Affairs I, no. 2 (Fall 2005), 1-11, 
http://www.hsaj.org/pages/volume1/issue2/pdfs/1.2.1.pdf (accessed August 29, 2007), 10. 
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On September 12, 2006, five years after the horrific World Trade Center 
attacks, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff appeared before 
Congress to say, “no matter how hard we may try, we cannot eliminate every 
possible threat to every individual in every place at every moment. And if we 
could, it would be at untenable cost to our liberty and our prosperity. Only by 
carefully assessing threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, and prioritizing 
our resources, can we fully ensure the most practical and optimized protection for 
Americans and our nation.”5 If we, as first responders, seriously agree with 
Secretary Chertoff’s message that because it is impossible and costly, and no 
matter how we try defending our communities, then we should begin planning by 
adopting an attitude that consequence assessment is a critical component in any 
effort to build the resilience of the nation. In doing so, we will begin to understand 
the direct relationship between a result and its cause, whether it is that of an 
attack or natural disaster.  
First responders such as police officers, firefighters, public health officials 
and emergency medical providers realize that total prevention is impossible. 
Even if all terrorist attacks are prevented it is not possible to control nature, and 
therefore the nation remains vulnerable to natural disasters--the consequences 
of which can be more devastating than a manmade attack. Therefore, a local 
consequence reduction approach will result in risk reduction methodologies 
capable of working in an all-hazards framework. The benefit is dual use 
applications in promoting a culture of preparedness and, at the same time, 
building resilience at the community level. 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the need to enhance the 
significance of consequence assessment in local homeland security planning, 
wresting it out from under the dominance of threat and vulnerability calculations. 
                                            
5 Michael Chertoff, "Testimony of Secretary Michael Chertoff U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs," 
Department of Homeland Security, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_1158336548990.shtm (accessed August 29, 
2007), 2.  
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In Chapter II, I examine the elements of risk management and compare how the 
private sector, federal government and local officials view risk reduction. Chapter 
III provides an overview of how the risk-based approach is applied in distributing 
funds to local governments and how that method is failing from strategic, 
economic and practical viewpoints. Chapter IV describes consequences of a 
disaster in terms of preparedness and how federal guidance actually forces local 
governments to adopt short term; response oriented objectives rather than long 
term preparedness goals. Chapter V demonstrates how a comprehensive 
consequence assessment can assist local planners by revealing the need for a 
paradigm shift in the culture of preparedness necessary to build a resilient 
community. Chapter VI offers several conclusions and recommendations for 
enhancing the resilience of the nation, and ways to develop a culture of 
preparedness.  
 8
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II. ELEMENTS OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
This chapter will discuss the three variables of the risk equation and 
evaluate the elements of a risk assessment to determine how risk can be 
measured. Applied to the business sector, an assertion is made that 
consequence reduction is a viable business option that improves business 
resilience. Current risk models are identified and the relevance of each to 
consequence assessment is discussed.   
A. MEASURING RISK    
Although risk is a pervasive theme in homeland security writings and 
strategies, there is no single official tool to assess risk in government documents. 
The problem is that risk is defined and used many different ways by agencies 
planning toward the next attack or disaster. In a 2004 Congressional Research 
Service document entitled Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure 
Protection: Assessing, Integrating, and Managing Threats, Vulnerabilities and 
Consequences, author John Moteff cites several definitions of risk used by 
different federal agencies. He observes that the terms vulnerability, threat and 
risk are integrated and used repeatedly within documents; never clearly defined, 
and simultaneously clouding the intent of what is being proposed or discussed.6 
The result of this confusion is that these terms continue to be used loosely in 
hearings, articles in the press, and other public discourse.  
An example in the application of risk is defined in the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) – that risk is “a measure of potential harm 
that encompasses threat, vulnerability, and consequence. In this context, risk is 
the potential for loss, damage, or disruption to the Nation’s Critical 
                                            
6 John Moteff, Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Assessing, 
Integrating, and Managing Threats, Vulnerabilities and Consequences (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service,[2004]), https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/crs/nps17-100804-
19.pdf&code=80382dac961e832159cc3488e6d9f002 (accessed March 13, 2008), 3. 
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Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR) resulting from destruction, incapacitation, 
or exploitation during some future man-made or naturally occurring event.”7 Here 
the primary focus is on preventing system disruption rather then the 
consequence of a disruption during an incident. Ortwin Renn authored a white 
paper for the International Risk Governance Council that provides a framework 
for risk assessment and risk management strategies. Renn explains that risk 
always refers to a combination of two components: 1) the likelihood or chance of 
potential consequences, and 2) the severity of consequences of human activities, 
natural events or even a combination of both. Such consequences can be 
positive or negative, depending on the values people associate with them.8 
These distinctions are important when assessing consequences or developing 
risk management options because one favors vulnerability reduction and the 
other consequence reduction--both are very critical as planners identify risks.   
In the RAND study Guiding Resource Allocations Based on Terrorism 
Risk; Henry Willis claims the risk formula “provides a clear mapping between risk 
and approaches to managing or reducing risk.”9 He continues to note that 
intelligence and active defense--taking the fight to the enemy--represents a 
prevention approach to risk management that focuses specifically on threats. 
“Managing risk through vulnerability reduction is a defensive tactic that includes 
increasing surveillance and detection, hardening targets, or other capabilities that 
might reduce the success of attempted attacks. Finally, managing risk through 
consequence reduction is a strategy that employs planning and preparedness to 
improve response and reduce the effects of damage through mitigation or 
                                            
7 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 35. 
8 Ortwin Renn, Risk Governance: Towards an Integrative Approach (Geneva, Switzerland: 
International Risk Governance Council, 2006), 
http://www.irgc.org/irgc/IMG/projects/IRGC_WP_No_1_Risk_Governance_(reprinted_version).pdf 
(accessed August 26, 2007).  
9 Henry H. Willis, "Guiding Resource Allocations Based on Terrorism Risk," Risk Analysis 27, 
no. 3 (June 2007), 597-606, 599. 
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compensation.”10 There is a specific reference to the idea that consequences 
can be reduced effectively by methods other than vulnerability reduction. 
The perception of risk then lies in the eyes of the beholder, especially 
when deciding what to protect. For instance, Robert Ross, Deputy Director, 
Office of Comparative Studies in DHS’ Science and Technology Directorate 
argues that risk, no matter how well founded, is in reality a mental and emotional 
construct rather than a physical reality. He says that risk has to do with feelings 
about a possible future that would be different than we would like or expect.11 
Therefore, the manner in which consequences are visualized will have a potent 
impact on how risks are perceived. Consequence is the variable that gives risk its 
emotional impact and continues to be portrayed in only one dimension. The 
following three variables-- 1) threat, 2) vulnerability and 3) consequence--
continue to define risk and the current use for allocation of the homeland security 
grant process.    
1. Threat 
Threat has been defined as “the likelihood that a particular asset, system, 
or network will suffer an attack or an incident. In the context of risk from terrorist 
attack, the estimate of this is based on the analysis of the intent and the 
capability of an adversary; in the context of natural disaster or accident, the 
likelihood is based on the probability of occurrence.”12 In the recent RAND study 
Exploring Terrorist Targeting Preferences, threat is evaluated and analyzed by 
possible motives for major worldwide terrorist attacks beginning from the 1993 
World Trade Center bombing in New York to the 2004 Hilton Hotel bombing in 
Taba, Egypt. On the basis of past al Qaeda operations and statements it would 
appear that the group’s target selection has been heavily influenced by three 
                                            
10 Willis, "Guiding Resource Allocations Based on Terrorism Risk," 599. 
11 Robert G. Ross, "Risk and Decision-Making in Homeland Security" (Baltimore, MD, 
Society for Risk Analysis Annual Meeting, December 3-6, 2006, 5. 
12 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 35. 
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motivations: 1) to coerce (unfriendly governments), 2) to damage economies and 
3) to rally supporters and potential supporters.13 Motive encompasses the 
relationship between the group’s goals and its perception of the value of 
attacking a given target as a way of fostering these goals. Target selection, of 
course, is not the same as motive.  
“Intent alone is insufficient to predict what will be attacked because 
feasibility must be taken into account.”14 Nor can motives be used alone as a 
reliable attack predictor. Terrorists must also have the capability to conduct an 
attack, although capability does not define what a group wants to do. Capability 
is a combination of resources, applied against a vulnerable target that fulfills the 
group’s intentions at an acceptable cost. When assessing the risk, a simple and 
useful definition of threat is “the probability that a specific target is attacked in a 
specific way during a specified time period.”15 The continued problem with 
defining threat is that threat is a function of a series of unknown variables. If any 
variable equals zero then the threat remains zero as well. The only way to 
prevent terrorism is through intelligence. An effective intelligence gathering 
program can infiltrate and observe the actors who will carry out attacks; it can 
monitor the development of resources that build capability; and, it can maintain 
the situational awareness that is needed to preempt and stop terrorist attacks on 
any targets. Most local governments have limited access to federal intelligence 
sources and minimal terrorist intelligence-gathering capability.  
2. Vulnerability 
Vulnerability is defined by the NIPP as “the likelihood that a characteristic 
of, or flaw in - an asset, system, or network’s design, location, security posture, 
process, or operation renders it susceptible to destruction, incapacitation, or 
                                            
13 Martin C. Libicki, Peter Chalk and Melanie Sisson, Exploring Terrorist Targeting 
Preferences (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG483.pdf (accessed March 13, 2008), 95. 
14 Ibid., 3. 
15 Willis, Guiding Resource Allocations Based on Terrorism Risk, 598. 
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exploitation by terrorist or other intentional acts, mechanical failures, and natural 
hazards.”16 Often seen as the probability that an attack of a given type will 
succeed, vulnerability commonly represents “the probability that damages occur, 
given a specific attack type, at a specific time, on a given target.”17 Damages 
may involve fatalities, injuries, property damage, or other consequences–-there is 
no limit. It is at this moment when the operative terminology becomes Critical 
Infrastructure Protection. Target hardening has become one of the primary 
counter terrorism strategies employed by state and local HLS professionals. 
Unfortunately, local HLS professionals in the quest for zero risk can mistakenly 
view vulnerability reduction as a preventive strategy, when in reality vulnerability 
reduction is purely a defensive posture, giving it a higher emphasis than it 
deserves. Vulnerability reduction is a defensive mode, and it would be a 
misnomer to consider it preventative. Gates, guns and gadgets defend specific 
assets from the enemy.  
Vulnerability at the local government level should be viewed as an inability 
to maintain vital services. There are too many targets and not enough threats to 
attempt defending each asset. However, the measures taken to support victims 
of a chemical plant explosion are the same as a freight train wreck. The same 
can be argued for a bomb at a shopping center or a tornado through a town, or 
an influenza pandemic and a biological weapon. Locally, planners have to 
prepare for all types of hazards, and consequence assessments can identify 
preparedness gaps. 
3. Consequence  
Consequence, the last variable in the equation of the risk based formula 
has been categorized in ways such as economic; financial; environmental; 
                                            
16 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 35. 
17 Willis, “Guiding Resource Allocations Based on Terrorism Risk,” 598. 
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technological, operational, health and safety; and, relevant to time.18 Literature 
studying aspects of consequence exists in various disciplines concerned with risk 
or risk reduction. Lloyd Dixon and William Thompson both wrote articles that 
reviewed actual costs of the September 11th attacks. Robert Hartwig and 
Christopher Lewis wrote articles concerning the impacts on the insurance 
industry caused by terrorist attacks. Michael Moody and Janice Obuchowski 
wrote about business applications of risk reduction methods. Charles Meade and 
Roger Molander of RAND presented an analysis of a hypothetical nuclear attack 
on the Port of Long Beach, while Henry Willis, also of RAND, used an insurance 
industry risk assessment model to rank the risk to Urban Area Security Initiative 
regions. Vickie Bier applied game models and probability to compare different 
defender strategies in homeland security situations. 
During the risk assessment process, however, limited effort goes into the 
process of quantifying consequence. There is a need to Identify and enumerate 
elements such as loss of lives; number/type of non-fatal injuries; medical costs; 
housing units lost; number of people requiring shelter, etc. This process is time–
consuming, with numerous data sources outside the normal sphere of business 
for first responders.  However, these elements are responsive to mitigation and 
could reduce consequences, if identified with proper planning. Three recent 
studies, each otherwise exceptionally well done, lack detail on the important 
measure of the impact of lives lost in a consequence assessment. First, a 2006 
RAND study was conducted to consider the effects of a nuclear attack on the 
Port of Long Beach, CA.19 While this study estimates the number of people killed 
in the attack, demonstrating that this type of assessment is both possible and 
feasible, it is framed solely in terms of dollars of economic and actuarial loss. A 
                                            
18 John Moteff, Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Assessing, 
Integrating, and Managing Threats, Vulnerabilities and Consequences (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2005), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32561.pdf 
(accessed March 13, 2008), 5. 
19 Charles Meade and Roger C. Molander, Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic 
Terrorist Attack (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy, 2006), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR391.pdf (accessed August 26, 2007). 
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second study conducted by RAND was to evaluate the consequences to the 
World Trade Center attacks. Here again, the study addressed loss in terms of 
compensation paid to the victims of the attacks. The classes of loss were applied 
to the following:   
• personal injury: death, physical injury, environmental exposure 
injuries, emotional injuries, and workman’s compensation 
• financial injuries: income loss to workers and resident’s, small 
business losses, business interruption and event cancellation, 
economic revitalization, environmental clean-up  
• property damage.20  
Lastly, in a 2002 study conducted by William C. Thompson, Jr., 
Comptroller of the City of New York, Mr. Thompson explored the unexpected 
expenses experienced by the city in terms of lost tax revenue, additional 
operational expenses and capital costs. In this study, unexpected loses are 
considered and an assessment of the lost wealth in both property and human 
potential is included, and also provides an estimate of the loss to the Gross City 
Product.21 The sum of these studies incorporates a wide-ranging picture of the 
social and personal effects of consequences of a catastrophic terrorist attack, 
which can be used to begin to enumerate or catalog the classes of risk and begin 
to point out where data sets exist for further study. Unfortunately, it took the 
emotional impact of lives lost at the World Trade Center Terrorist attack as well 
as the natural disaster of Hurricane Katrina to force the homeland security 
mindset to begin thinking along the lines of increasing the application of 
consequence as a critical factor in the risk assessment equation. At the federal  
 
 
                                            
20 Lloyd Dixon and Rachel Kaganoff Stern, Compensation for Losses from the 9/11 Attacks 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG264.pdf (accessed August 29, 2007). 
21 William P. Thompson, Jr., One Year Later: The Fiscal Impact of 9/11 on New York City 
(New York, NY: City of New York, Office of Comptroller, 2002), 
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/bud/reports/impact-9-11-year-later.pdf (accessed August 
27, 2007). 
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level, however, the lessons learned from these tragedies and the knowledge we 
have gained from them have not significantly influenced the depth of DHS’s 
utilization of consequences in risk assessments formula.  
Figure 1 demonstrates the latest iteration of the consequence variable, 
illustrating its added weight in the 2007 Risk Based Approach formula. At first 
glance one will conclude that vulnerability and consequence equal 80 points and 
threat is 20 points – sounds good, right? Not really! The figure actually shows 
that vulnerability and consequence factors are comprised of four elements--two 
pure consequence factors of a population index and an economic index. But also 
included is a national infrastructure index that relates to vulnerability as well as a 
national security Index that relates to regional threat.22 This is the very point of 
the thesis: that, although broken out to a degree, consequence is not measured 
in a fashion that facilitates discussion of any strategy other than vulnerability 
reduction. Local agencies are unable to seriously consider consequence as an 
equal part of the equation. This system becomes convoluted and further proves 
that consequence is not taken seriously, especially since this is the formula used 
for the 2007 DHS allocation matrix for Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) 
Areas.  
                                            
22 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security Grants: Observations on 
Process DHS used to Allocate Funds to Selected Urban Areas (Washington, DC: GAO, (2007), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07381r.pdf (accessed August 27, 2007), 6. 
 17
 
Figure 1.   DHS Risk Assessment Methodology for Fiscal Year 2007 UASI 
Funding Note: DIB is Defense Industrial Base.23  
Information on risk provides local, state, and federal homeland security 
leaders with the basis for understanding the trade-offs between the probability of 
an attack and its consequences as well as a metric (i.e., expected fatalities or 
property losses) for making decisions on prevention and protection actions. The 
ability to answer questions regarding attack-mode likelihood provides local 
homeland security officials with information concerning the types of attack for 
which they should prepare. Available targets, local characteristics and 
attractiveness to terrorists of particular attack modes vary from one city to 
another. Planning for each attack variant is time consuming and expensive for 
local government. Therefore, information on consequences provides local 
officials an understanding of what the effects of such attacks might be and 
identifies the common resources necessary to respond.24 
                                            
23 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security Grants: Observations on 
Process DHS used to Allocate Funds to Selected Urban Areas, 6. 
24 Henry H. Willis and others, Terrorism Risk Modeling for Intelligence Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2007/RAND_TR386.pdf (accessed March 13, 2008), 
Summary, xv. 
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B. RISK APPLIED TO INDUSTRY AND BUSINESS 
Viewed by the insurance industry, risk is more concerned with economic 
loss–-specifically property loss and actuarial costs. The insurance industry 
concerns are expressed as the inability to assign economic responsibility for 
risk.25 Consequence is viewed in dollar terms in order to value risk pools and/or 
risk portfolios so that financial exposure is also reduced. It is fair to conclude that 
their approach to risk management of terrorist threats is strictly to minimize 
financial liability and not to enumerate or define consequence related factors. 
Financial studies focus on disaster loss and cost reimbursement for recovery.  
In his testimony before Congress, Christopher Lewis, Vice President of 
Alternate Market Solutions for the Hartford Financial Group, described the 
insurance dilemma by saying “the primary issue before the Congress with 
respect to managing the impact of terrorism on the U.S. economy is to identify 
the most efficient means to finance the risk of terrorism.”26 If true, this statement 
certainly supports the industry position that the random nature of terrorist attacks, 
the potentially catastrophic nature of an attack and the relatively small number of 
data sets prevent development of a reliable predictive rate model.27  This 
underscores the problem that the insurance industry faces--determining how to 
build risk pools that will cover major attacks yet remain affordable to private 
sector clients. If the industry is unable to reasonably forecast where losses will 
occur and build risk pools capable of surviving the random terrorist attack without 
bankrupting the company or pricing premiums out of the reach of customers, they 
will seek protection from the federal government. Recent advances in 
consequence assessments evolve from firms who rate insurance industry 
                                            
25 Willis and others, Terrorism Risk Modeling for Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection 
26 Christopher M. Lewis, Terrorism Threats and the Insurance Market, July 25, 2006), 1, 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/testimony/nps30-112806-
05.pdf&code=fdcc9268909f5a990576e32d11c9f054 (accessed August 25, 2007), 1. 
27 Robert P. Hartwig, "The Cost of Terrorism: How Much Can We Afford?" (Philadelphia, PA, 
National Association of Business, Economics, 46th Annual Meeting, October 4, 2004, 
http://server.iii.org/yy_obj_data/binary/736851_1_0/tria.ppt (accessed August 29, 2007). 
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Catastrophe Funds, risk pools that are specifically designed to underwrite mega-
catastrophes such as Hurricane Katrina. Here sophisticated modeling creates 
detailed forecasts of probabilities of a disaster and the financial consequences. 
These models have been used to good effect analyzing natural disasters of all 
types because of the amount of reliable data on these events.  
C. RISK MODELS 
DHS has developed baseline standards for assessing, analyzing, and 
combining the three specific components that make up risk, consequence, 
vulnerability, and threat28, and yet strategies to reduce risk have primarily 
concentrated on risk assessments that stress the defensive tactic of vulnerability 
reduction. For vulnerabilities to be identified and reduced, state and local 
homeland security planners rely on risk assessment models applicable to their 
own jurisdiction. In his book Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland 
Security, Ted G. Lewis developed a model with high degrees of complexity and 
methodologies for allocating vulnerability reduction resources on a sector or 
system wide basis. The model is known as the Model Based Vulnerability 
Assessment (MBVA) approach in which risk is viewed as vulnerability times cost. 
Consequences, on the other hand, are framed in general terms - principally 
economic, but the true focus of this model is on fault reduction rather than 
consequence assessment. 
1. Natural Disaster Models 
The National Oceanographic and Air Administration (NOAA) and Federal 
Emergency Management Agency developed models applicable to natural 
disaster. The NOAA Earth System Research Laboratory maintains a library of 
weather and ocean system data sources that are available to modelers and 
forecasters as part of its Real Time Verification System. This information allows 
highly detailed forecasts and provides resources for prospective and 
                                            
28 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 36.  
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retrospective studies when planning for a natural disaster. FEMA’s Hazards U.S. 
Multi-Hazard (HAZUS-MH) is a nationally applicable standardized methodology 
and software program that estimates potential losses from earthquakes, 
hurricane winds, and floods. Although natural disasters are difficult to plan for, 
“estimating losses is essential to decision-making at all levels of government, 
providing a basis for developing mitigation plans and policies, emergency 
preparedness, and response and recovery planning.”29 NOAA and FEMA models 
go further, to analyze risk by assessing potential loss mitigation strategies on the 
basis of 1) threat--based on historic storm tracks, weather patterns etc.; 2) 
vulnerability--based on historic event data; 3) capability, based upon storm or 
event projections; 4) and consequence--based on potential for human and 
financial loss. The ability to apply these variables consistently in the planning 
process is crucial as we attempt to reduce risk and capture loss data in the 
footprint of natural disasters.  
As models are developed towards risk reductions, researchers are refining 
risk estimates for the insurance industry while consultants are improving risk 
assessment software - they are realizing the importance of consequence as a 
variable within their models, whether it is for terrorism, natural disasters or all-
hazards planning. Provisions in modern building codes reflecting consideration of 
seismic effects on structures and standards for construction methods resistant to 
wind and water damage are examples of the private sector employing lessons 
learned from natural disasters. These are, in turn, used to influence government 
regulation and mandate mitigation strategies to reduce potential losses.   
2. Terrorist Attack Models 
Several modeling attempts have been developed, but the most recent 
impressive model applicable to consequence assessment is identified in a 2007 
study called Terrorism Risk Modeling for Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure 
                                            
29 "HAZUS-MH Overview," FEMA, 
http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/hazus/hz_overview.shtm (accessed March 17, 2008). 
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Protection30 developed by Risk Management Solutions (RMS) in which 
researchers utilize a Probabilistic Terrorism Risk Model. The importance of 
modeling terrorist attacks is:  
if the resources required to accomplish different attacks can be 
characterized, if some insight into terrorist capabilities can be 
collected, and if the consequences of different attacks can be 
related to terrorists’ goals, then the full set of possible attacks could 
be reduced to only those for which the terrorists’ capabilities meet 
or exceed the attack requirements and for which attack 
consequences correspond to their goals. The basic approach thus 
entails comparing terrorists’ intentions, capabilities, and resources 
with the resource requirements and consequence estimates for 
various possible attacks in an attempt to constrain the range of 
probable attacks and, ultimately, to help guide intelligence analysis 
and surveillance efforts.31 
The Probabilistic Terrorism Risk Model considers various target 
characteristics and attack methods to rank attack threat. The model attempts to 
take terrorist motives, resource needs and capabilities into account. The criticality 
of this model today relative to consequence assessment is fascinating, as it 
demonstrates how detailed consequence assessment will contribute to the 
planning stages when assessing risk. Not only can the RMS model assess 
various attack categories based on the threat such as biological, chemical, 
radiological, nuclear and explosive, but it identifies target type such as cultural 
icons, infrastructure sector, municipality or specific location. The versatility of this 
model is that it can be applied anywhere in the country. Of course, accuracy and 
specificity will increase as detailed local information is inserted into the model.  
Agencies agree that the best method today to prevent terrorist attacks is 
through intelligence; the RMS model demonstrates capability to use intelligence 
information to provide an estimate of attack scenarios representing the greatest 
risk. By using risk analysis tools, such as the RMS model, raw intelligence can be 
                                            
30 Willis and others, Terrorism Risk Modeling for Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection.  
31 Ibid., 45. 
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analyzed to help understand what attack modes meet terrorists’ objectives in 
terms of consequences, required capabilities, and available skills and 
resources.32 Companies continue to develop and modify risk models that provide 
highly detailed consequence pictures capable to build out risk pools to insure 
assets at risk from terrorism or natural disaster and, at the same time, provide 
homeland security applications. No doubt there is the need to improve 
consequence-modeling methodology to assist preparedness efforts,33 and if 
utilized during the planning process, planners would have a greater 
understanding of the depth and reach of the effects of a given disaster.  
This chapter began by looking at the three variables of the risk equation--
how they are defined and how they are used. Each term has a different context 
for federal and local stakeholders. Threat, for instance, is a condition largely out 
of the purview of local officials. Vulnerability, however, has two contexts that 
relate to local government. Asset vulnerability has great importance if threat is 
uniform; however, we will see that this is not the case because terrorism risk is 
concentrated in a relatively few areas of the country. Therefore vulnerability 
should be viewed differently by local governments--not from a terrorist threat but 
from an all-hazards perspective. Consequences, on the other hand, are uniquely 
local and human in nature. Local officials have a vested interest in reducing 
casualties to incidents, yet the federal guidance largely ignores the human 
element of disaster consequences. These human elements are relatively well 
known thanks to the September 11th attacks and Hurricane Katrina; however, 
they are not weighted proportionally in federal guidance.  
 
                                            
32 Willis and others, Terrorism Risk Modeling for Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure 
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33 National Science and Technology Council, Combating Terrorism: Research Priorities in 
the Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the 
President, Office of Science and Technology Policy, 2004), 
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Private industry has recognized the importance of accurately assessing 
consequences and mitigating their effects as a necessary and cost effective 
business processes. As part of the consequence assessment process 
government and industry have developed models that can be modified to 
homeland security purposes. Adaptation of these models could yield tools that 
are adaptable to each level of government by assessing risk from different 
perspectives. The private sector approach to risk assessment is a more useful 
construct for local governments. It focuses on looking at vulnerabilities and 
finding ways to mitigate losses.  
 24
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III.  THE FLAWED SPENDING PROCESS 
There is a strategic basis for the local role in critical infrastructure 
protection, but since programs are being funded through a federal grant 
allocation, the spending process is flawed down the chain of federal, state and 
local agencies. There remains an assumption that the country is under a uniform 
level of threat; however, this very threat assumption has been challenged--
eroding the underlying principal of the HSGP and UASI grants. Grant 
management audits will be exposed to reveal numerous shortcomings in state 
management of homeland security funds. 
A. HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM (HSGP) AND URBAN 
AREA SECURITY INITIATIVE (UASI) 
In an effort to direct local homeland security strategies toward national 
strategy goals, the federal grant guidelines specify funding priorities that direct 
local officials to risk reduction activities on targets identified by one of the risk 
assessment tools promulgated by DHS and/or state Homeland Security 
strategies. Once again, these risk assessment tools are based on the formula 
mentioned earlier R = f (T, V, C). The benefit of this approach to critical 
infrastructure protection is that grant spending is directed to risk reduction 
outcomes. The problem today is that there is no requirement, methodology or 
evaluation tool to assess whether expenditures do lead to actual risk reductions, 
especially within the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) and Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI) allocations. In fact, Ted Lewis states, “performing 
vulnerability and risk analysis of national assets at the local level will generally 
lead to waste and ineffective use of resources.”34 Negative publicity on 
ineffective use of resources will continue as long as agencies do not have 
metrics to measure risk reduction.  
                                            
34 Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a 
Networked Nation (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006), 474. 
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Lewis’ skepticism regarding the effectiveness of local homeland security 
spending and decisions concerning critical infrastructure vulnerability reduction 
stems from two uncertainties: 1) a lack of understanding of where the local 
measures fit in the overall infrastructure sector-wide risk picture and 2) what 
consequences, if any, the local measures have averted. This holds true, but to a 
slightly lesser extent, for federally funded measures to improve response 
capability, because guidance is still geared to the short term and incremental 
improvements. Unfortunately, the risk assessment tools do not encourage a 
comprehensive, empirical consequence assessment of an attack or natural 
disaster. Preparedness and mitigation efforts are hampered by the tunnel vision 
that results when consequence is portrayed simply as a dollar figure used to 
prioritize vulnerability reduction projects, without considering the full scope and 
nature of the impact of the disaster. The challenge is changing the mindset that 
defense is the single best option in every risk reduction situation. Risk 
management policies cannot truly manage risk without knowing the dynamics 
and costs of the consequences. HLS spending priorities continue to be set 
without complete understanding or awareness of consequences, costs of 
mitigation, or effectiveness of defensive measures. It is imperative that HLS 
planners begin to enumerate the many effects of terrorist attack and natural 
disaster that comprise the total range of disaster consequences. 
UASI funds address the unique multi-disciplinary planning, operations, 
equipment, training, and exercise needs of high-threat, high-density urban areas. 
This program provides funding to high-risk urban areas based on risk and 
effectiveness.35 The intent was to ensure that necessary funding for 
infrastructure protection was allocated throughout the country, distributed to 
county and local communities for various HLS projects, and expected to meet the 
mission statement and goals of the Department of Homeland Security. In 2005, 
                                            
35 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FY 2007 Homeland Security Grant Program 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2007), 
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the UASI program allocated $854 million to fifty UASI regions. In 2007, the same 
UASI program reduced both the allocation and the number of recipients by 
budgeting $746 million to forty-five (45) UASI regions. In the research of Vickie 
Bier, Choosing What to Protect, the decentralized strategy of funding multiple 
defenders to defend large numbers of assets is challenged. Several defensive 
strategies are evaluated, and Bier finds that defenders can only optimize 
expenditures based on the following conditions:   
• there are a limited number of targets,  
• a centralized defender (i.e., federal government) will more 
efficiently allocate resources than a de-centralized defender (i.e., 
state and local governments), and 
• defending low value targets not only wastes resources but actually 
increases the likelihood that a higher value target will be attacked.  
If applied to the real world homeland security strategy, troubling 
connotations would eventually result in the realization that we are employing the 
least effective method and strategy relative to the grant process. Actually, the 
strategy underlying the HSGP and UASI grant programs may actually be 
counterproductive to the homeland security mission.36 A major problem for risk 
reduction using HSGP and UASI spending is that the funds are utilized for 
defensive measures on various targets perceived locally to be valuable but 
without reference to wider national or cross-jurisdictional priorities. If taken in this 
context there are–-for all practical purposes–-an unlimited number of assets of 
undetermined value in areas with unknown threat. “Spending too much on 
defense of assets that are not highly valuable hurts the defender in two ways — 
not only by wasting resources on defense of assets that are unlikely to be 
attacked in any case, but also by increasing the likelihood of a more valuable 
asset being attacked.”37 Lewis’ assertion that infrastructure protection tasks 
relegated to local government generally lead to waste and ineffective use of 
                                            
36 Vicki M. Bier, "Choosing what to Protect," Risk Analysis 27, no. 3 (June 2007), 607-620. 
37 Ibid., 611. 
 28
resources is supported by the formula spending plan.38 Current practices and 
spending are compelling evidence, and support Ms. Bier’s argument that 
decentralized defenders will invest in defensive solutions that are either 
marginally effective or which deflect risk to another defender. The reality is that 
protecting low-risk targets can be harmful to overall security.39  
Both HSGP and UASI spending reveals the need to quantify consequence 
scenarios so that parameters are established in order to measure the 
effectiveness of risk reduction measures. “DHS acknowledges the uncertainty of 
consequence values [used in the risk assessment model equation for the HSGP 
and UASI] used in the model, but does not know of available databases for 
consequence information for all asset-scenario pairs.”40 When RAND 
researchers analyzed the risk of terrorist attacks in UASI regions they 
recommended, “DHS should incorporate terrorism estimates such as these, 
along with natural disaster risk estimates, into the assessment process to support 
grant allocations and other assistance to states and localities. Further, DHS 
should consider investing in the extensions of insurance-industry models noted 
previously to improve the usefulness of this approach to homeland security 
analyses.”41 In order to realistically plan for and offer measurable protection 
against threats, we should apply models that already have identified 
consequence as a variable equal to threat and vulnerability—the very point of 
this thesis. If this type of guidance were available to local planners, they would be 
able to better formulate a risk management strategy. 
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B. CHALLENGING THE THREAT ASSUMPTION  
Since the color-coded threat index was first introduced in March 2002, 
New York City continues to be at a state of Orange Alert. “The increased 
emphasis on soft targets seen overseas may be replicated in the United States in 
large part because more prominent venues have become hardened. Since 
September 11, concerted moves have been made to upgrade security around 
high-profile landmarks such as the Pentagon, the White House, the Capitol, state 
legislature offices, and foreign diplomatic missions. These initiatives have 
exacerbated the difficulty of attacking prominent sites in the United States. In so 
doing, this has arguably triggered a process of potential threat displacement 
toward softer targets such as sports stadiums, shopping malls, hospitals, 
restaurants, nightclubs, cinema complexes, office buildings, airport arrival halls, 
and train stations. There are a plethora of these venues across the country, 
which, given their emphasis on public access, necessarily preclude the type of 
intrusive and sustained security that can be placed around “high-value” targets. 
Moreover, because large congregations of people typically gather at these 
locations, the opportunity for achieving a large number of casualties is 
significantly increased.”42 Planners must critically evaluate defensive strategies 
side-by-side with consequence reduction strategies, to determine which 
approach best meets all their needs, including but not determined by cost 
savings.   
The concept that each region or metropolitan area of the entire nation was 
under a uniform level of threat was challenged in a 2007 RAND study of the 
UASI regions. The risk assessment tool mentioned earlier as the Probabilistic 
Terrorism Model was applied in three ways: 1) evaluate how threat reduces risk, 
2) generate terrorism threat profiles for specific cities or regions, and 3) apply 
threat modeling to guide intelligence analysis. This model used eight target 
groups such as government buildings, business districts, transportation, industrial 
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facilities, power plants etc. to assess threat. These target groups included a 
variety of subjective asset characteristics such as high consequence, high value, 
and high iconic value.43 The study findings concluded that 95% of the total 
terrorism risk in the United States is concentrated in eight urban areas: New York 
City (62%), Chicago (12%), and six other cities (Washington, DC, San Francisco, 
Los Angeles, Boston, Houston and Philadelphia combine for 21%). The 
remaining thirty-seven UASI regions shared a cumulative total of 5% of the 
national risk. If the stated intent of the UASI funding is to ”fund high-risk urban 
areas based on risk and effectiveness,”44 there is compelling evidence to 
suggest that the formula for the risk based approach is not effective, reliable or 
even purposeful in identifying risk. The UASI program is not on a solid strategic 
footing, and the funding allocations are dispensed according to flawed threat 
assumptions or simply ignorance to the grant management problems identified in 
random audits conducted by DHS.  The political pressure brought to bear on 
DHS when the risk based approach was introduced also speaks to the programs’ 
objectivity.  
C. RANDOM AUDITS  
The Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General 
audits UASI, HSGP and other first responder grant awards to states on a random 
basis. Seven audits were done: Colorado, Florida, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, Virginia and Georgia have yet to receive a clean bill of health. 
Embarrassing as it is, the results were indicative of grant allocations that lacked 
accountability in the spending process. The audits revealed poor purchasing 
controls, unauthorized expenditures, late or missing performance reporting and 
failures to allocate funding to high risk areas or according to state HLS strategies. 
It is important to note the failures of the following states that were audited: 
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• The State of Colorado was cited with failing to follow state HLS 
strategy, grant management lapses, and expenditures that did not 
comply with grant guidelines and funding allocated to low risk 
projects. The report goes on to question $12M in costs for both the 
UASI and HSGP grants between 2003 and 2004.45 
• Georgia was found to have failed to identify homeland security 
needs, used a centralized purchasing system that was ineffective, 
failed to effectively monitor sub-grantee contracts, and failed to 
allocate funds in a timely manner or properly. The report dismissed 
the reliability of the state strategy, stating that data in some 
categories were demonstrably incorrect. The survey reported the 
number of hazardous material teams to be 92, while only 38 such 
teams existed. Jurisdictions may have reported on the same threats 
and vulnerabilities. The survey offered no means of qualitatively 
assessing actual dangers posed by locally perceived threats and 
vulnerabilities. The 715 Potential Threat Elements identified 
statewide were exaggerated and have not yet been validated.46  
• Florida was cited for ineffective controls to ensure compliance with 
grant guidelines and sub-grantee contracts.  
• Pennsylvania reportedly tracked $150M in UASI and HSGP grants 
from 2002 through 2004. DHS uncovered $721K in unsupported 
and undocumented expenditures, late financial and progress 
reports, failure to monitor performance for effectiveness against 
strategic goals, and the final expenditure reports and the audits did 
not agree.  
• New Jersey had to return $247K related to unsupported 
expenditures of the $115M in grant funds received between 2002 
and 2004 because adequate documentation did not exist among 
some sub-grantees.  
• Virginia did not allocate funds on basis of risk and did not monitor 
local government programs adequately. The state purchased 
$417K in unauthorized equipment out of the $53.5M funds received 
between 2002 and 2003.  
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• North Carolina – Unreliable accounting for grant expenditures and 
reduced capability to monitor grants in an adequate fashion were 
problems brought to light in North Carolina. The Inspector General 
cited reduced compliance assurance with the Office of Domestic 
Preparedness program guidance and related regulations, reduced 
security of sensitive assessment and vulnerability data, lack of 
consistency, effectiveness, and efficiency in administering grants, 
and reduced assurance that grant purchases have and will 
enhance terrorism preparedness and increase interoperability 
across responder disciplines. All of these findings were results of 
the audit of the $58M the state received between 2002 and 2003.47   
The official reports of the problems that states have in securing funds, 
targeting projects and spending within grant lifetimes reinforce the growing 
perception that the grant programs were hastily put together to address problems 
that may not be critical to the high risk threat. News reports frequently turn up 
stories that highlight failures within the grant process, stories like the purchase of 
an air-conditioned garbage truck with homeland security grants in Newark, New 
Jersey, and the purchase riding lawnmowers used for racing in Texas. The 
publicity enrages taxpayers, embarrasses politicians and delights late night talk 
show hosts, but it does point to glaring problems in the country’s anti-terrorism 
strategy. With the nation’s sense of security shattered by 9/11, it appears that 
Congress responded by throwing money at both real and imagined problems.  
Decades of status quo existed within the emergency response discipline, and 
receiving an influx of money like this was welcomed by first response and public 
safety agencies. The bottom line is that the similarity of problems uncovered by 
the DHS audits proves that states and local governments are ill prepared to 
control the funds or effectively target their use.  
This chapter reviewed two grant programs administered by DHS to 
promote local homeland security. The strategic basis for the UASI and HSGP 
grant programs has been called into question on two critical issues–-the risk 
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based approach itself as well as its effectiveness. First, it was found that not all 
grant recipients are under high risk as identified in the risk based formula. In fact, 
most of the risk was centered in eight cities. In addition, the management of the 
funds at the local level has been questioned in every audit performed by DHS. 
These facts imply that there is a better use for the limited federal funds. Funding 
should be targeted at local preparedness building strategies aimed at 
consequence mitigation.  
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IV. CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT 
There is currently a failure to understand the complexity of consequences 
and the dangers of oversimplifying them during planning. Federal guidance on 
consequence assessment will reveal the ubiquitous federal focus on short term 
planning. Assessments of consequences, such as the psycho-social issues of 
mega-catastrophes are avoided during planning stages, allowing planners to 
dismiss the long term impact of the risk. Many data sources are discussed to 
assist planners tasked with developing a consequence assessment to begin to 
enumerate the impact consequence has during the assessment process.  
A. FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND  
In 2007, The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was 
announced; Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff is quoted as saying, 
“the conse2quences of an assault against America's vast network of critical 
infrastructure sites could be dire, both in loss of life and in economic impact; at 
the same time, we must avoid imposing onerous security measures that would 
damage or make economically impractical the very systems that we're trying to 
protect. The security roadmap announced today reflects unprecedented 
coordination among the public and private sectors. These plans are already 
significantly strengthening vital infrastructure and reducing vulnerability to all 
hazards–terrorist attack and natural disaster alike."48 It is safe then to refer to 
consequence as the magnitude and type of damage resulting from successful 
terrorist attacks and applied to a natural disaster, an industrial accident, an 
economic downturn or any event that causes harm in some way.49 However,  
 
                                            
48 Michael Chertoff, "DHS Completes Key Framework for Critical Infrastructure Protection," 
US Department of Homeland Security, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1179773665704.shtm (accessed July 7, 2007). 
49 Willis, Guiding Resource Allocations Based on Terrorism Risk, 599. 
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consequence assessment is yet to be fully employed because the ability to 
accurately account for consequence is hindered by the complexity of the process 
and the variety of information sources.    
In an unpublished essay, Mr. Robert Ross, a Deputy Director in DHS’s 
Science and Technology Directorate, elaborates on the nature of consequence 
by illustrating how consequences are comprised of factors that encompass a 
range of varying scale and dimension.50 It is the complexity of consequence that 
defies description. Throwing a pebble into a pond produces a series of concentric 
ripples. Throwing a hand full of pebbles into a pond produces a pattern of 
concentric ripples that add and subtract from each other in a confusing 
configuration of waves. This is the picture of disaster consequences. The 
interrelationships and interdependencies present a confusing array of information 
that has to be evaluated and analyzed. Hence, the reality is that the default 
parameter that defines consequence in any risk reduction method is dollars. 
Although dollars may be the least common denominator, it neither adequately 
portrays the human and social costs nor describes the extent or impact of the 
consequences of a terrorist attack or natural disaster. This one dimensionality 
discourages development of alternatives to defense based planning. The ability 
to measure the impact of disaster is something we, as a community, can certainly 
relate to. For example, the September 11, 2001 attack and Hurricane Katrina 
have provided us with a much better idea of the breadth and depth of the 
consequences of major catastrophic events specifically relative to the human, 
economic and social impacts a disaster can have on the planning, response and 
recovery stages.  
We get hit hard when consequences are felt, seeing how far they reach 
back and realizing the impact of direct and indirect costs of a disaster. Still, 
despite this knowledge, there is no empirical method to forecast the 
consequences of an attack or natural disaster. By quantifying consequences as 
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an integral component of a risk assessment, policy makers can visualize the 
effects of a disaster and determine the best cost-benefit ratio between defense 
and mitigation. Yet, as long as consequences continue to be viewed as 
generalized abstractions there will be no incentive to view mitigation as a 
strategic element of Homeland Security. A hallmark of a catastrophe is in the 
rapid degeneration of the situation and the cascade of failures that occur. Events 
unfold in rapid succession, and responders find themselves unable to resolve 
one problem before a new one evolves. In these situations, responders are 
steeped in a reactive posture, letting the events form the response. Progress 
against the incident will not be made until responders transition into a proactive 
response mode, anticipating problems before they occur, and setting solutions 
into play before problems get out of control. Assessing the consequences prior to 
occurrence can forewarn the responder of what to expect and shorten the 
interval to transition from reactive to proactive response.  
A comprehensive consequence assessment can be incorporated into the 
risk assessment process, but should include specific categories and measures 
capable of revealing response and resilience factors. State and local planners 
must be able to quantify needed response resources and resilience building 
measures. The process then will aid policymakers to formulate a vivid picture of 
consequences so they can objectively choose between defensive and mitigation 
options when planning their homeland security strategy. The primary benefit is 
having a critical review of the range and nature of consequences during strategic 
policy development, especially when allocating finite resources to homeland 
security programs. Both human and economic measures of consequence 
reduction must be incorporated into the risk assessment formula.  
B. FEDERAL GUIDANCE ON CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT  
Local emergency planners are responsible to align their planning and 
preparedness efforts toward four critical documents as set forth by the 
Department of Homeland Security. The federal documents include: 1) The 
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National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP); 2) National Strategy for Homeland 
Security; 3) National Response Framework, consisting of twenty-two Emergency 
Support Functions (ESF); and 4) The National Preparedness Guidelines, that 
includes a planning checklist known as the Universal Task List (UTL) as well as a 
Target Capabilities List (TCL) which provides a benchmark for assessing 
preparedness. The purpose of these documents is meant to guide local officials 
not only in developing their planning and preparedness plans, but also to provide 
a uniform and consistent baseline methodology among local, state and federal 
responses to any given event. The main drawback with these documents is that 
they are all heavily response biased. Recovery issues are strictly short term. 
The NIPP, for example, is a guidance document provided to planners to 
assess all risks in the area of Critical Infrastructure Protection–-the key word here 
is protection. The NIPP describes certain protective actions to be identified when 
assessing consequence, vulnerability and threat:   
• Consequences: Protective programs directly limit or manage 
consequences by reducing the possible loss resulting from a 
terrorist attack or other disaster through redundant system design, 
backup systems, and alternative sources for raw materials or 
information. 
• Vulnerability: Protective programs directly reduce vulnerability by 
decreasing the susceptibility to destruction, incapacitation, or 
exploitation by correcting flaws or strengthening weaknesses in 
assets, systems, and networks. 
• Threat: Protective programs indirectly reduce threat by making 
assets, systems, or networks less attractive targets to terrorists by 
lessening vulnerability and lowering consequences. As a result, 
terrorists are less likely to achieve their objectives and therefore, 
less likely to focus on the CI/KR (Critical Infrastructure/Key 
Resource) in question.51  
Not only are emergency planners utilizing the NIPP guidance document in 
their planning efforts, but public and private sector entities often include risk 
management frameworks in their business continuity plans because the planning 
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methodology includes the process of being able to identify assets, assess the 
risks, prioritize the problems, measure the performance and implement a strategy 
capable of protecting the program.52 Businesses are more likely to resort to 
mitigating solutions to reduce consequences in the form of business 
interruptions. Local government agencies do not investigate mitigation solutions 
because of their predisposition to defensive and short term response options. 
The consequence of an attack or incident continues to be framed in ways that 
reduce impact to the functionality of the asset rather than impact to the 
community. Defensive actions, redundant supply chains or systems are all 
protective strategies. The NIPP is not intended as community protection 
guidance, yet it does refer to a local role in the protection of assets in their 
jurisdiction.53 The NIPP pushes preparedness planners toward defensive and 
response based planning efforts rather than mitigation or recovery based 
solutions. 
In 2007, The National Strategy for Homeland Security was revised to unify 
our nation’s homeland security efforts by focusing its efforts on four goals: 1) 
prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks, 2) protect the American people, our critical 
infrastructure, and key resources; 3) respond to and recover from incidents that 
do occur; and 4) continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long-term 
success. “While the first three goals help to organize our national efforts, the last 
goal entails creating and transforming our homeland security principles, systems, 
structures, and institutions. This includes applying a comprehensive approach to 
risk management, building a culture of preparedness, developing a 
comprehensive Homeland Security Management System, improving incident 
management, better utilizing science and technology, and leveraging all instru-
ments of national power and influence.”54 All aspects of government vital to the  
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health, safety and well being of our citizens must be strengthened and officials 
prepared to lead and sustain the nation during and following a catastrophic 
emergency.  
Revised in January 2008, The National Response Framework is the most 
recent and up–to-date guide to federal response in an all-hazards framework 
focusing on response and short term recovery. The framework includes fifteen 
ESFs as “critical mechanism to coordinate functional capabilities and resources 
provided by Federal departments and agencies, along with certain private-sector 
and nongovernmental organizations. They represent an effective way to bundle 
and funnel resources and capabilities to local, tribal, State, and other 
responders.”55 The application of the framework to local planning, however, 
lowers the planning horizon to short term objectives and immediate response. 
The need for detailed consequences is not apparent when the planning horizon 
is lowered because the catastrophic impacts lie just below the response horizon. 
If consequences are assessed in detail at this point, the need for a higher level of 
preparedness becomes apparent, and the planning horizon is raised to study 
long term recovery needs. So, rather than support the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, the National Response Framework can actually diminish the 
resilience and preparedness of the nation by focusing on the narrow slice of an 
emergency, identified as the “initial response.” 
The National Preparedness Guidelines is the Readers Digest Version of 
seventeen homeland security documents. It inexplicably combines the National 
Homeland Security Strategy and four other strategies, resulting in a convoluted 
preparedness master plan that utilizes three planning tools. The first tool is the 
fifteen National Planning Scenarios that assist local planners to focus 
government and private sector response resources. Next is the Universal Task 
List (UTL), a set of sixteen hundred unique tasks, expected to somehow 
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(accessed March 17, 2008), 57. 
 41
“facilitate efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from the 
major events that are represented by the National Planning Scenarios.”56 The 
downside to the UTL is that although it does address planning and long term 
recovery issues, in very general terms, missing is a method to assess long term 
needs so that planners can determine what they are planning for or recovering 
from. The recovery mission section within the UTL calls for the provision of long 
and short term medical and mental health services, restoration of the 
environment and restoration of government and public utility services. Then there 
is the Target Capabilities List (TCL) in which there are thirty-seven specific 
capabilities in which every community is expected to plan towards responding to 
the incident scenarios.  
A common task of the TCL is a consequence analysis of critical 
infrastructure. This consequence analysis should measure the expected outcome 
of specific scenarios based on analysis of the susceptibility to attack of the asset, 
given the functional characteristics of the targets, likely cascading impacts to 
interdependent assets, and the availability of response and recovery 
capabilities.57 This is an important concession to consequence assessment. 
Missing, again, is guidance on the how-to when considering the impact 
necessary to facilitate preparedness rather than response. The National Planning 
Scenarios (NPS) provide some of this guidance by detailing information in each 
scenario that can be applied to any locality by a planner with very little 
imagination. The NPS encourages consequence assessment at the local level 
and provides enough information to get the process started.  Numerous 
documents, thousands of pages and mixed messages intimidate planners, 
forcing them to assert their own approach in assessing risk.    
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C. CONSEQUENCE OF MEGA-CATASTROPHES 
Hurricane Katrina and September 11th could each be categorized as a 
mega-catastrophe. The Blue Ribbon Panel on Mega Catastrophes of the 
Financial Services Roundtable defines a mega-catastrophe as “a natural or man-
made event that has significant adverse national impacts on economic activity, 
property or human life.”58 Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 23, 2005, 
and eighteen months after the catastrophe, on April 19, 2007, Senator Mary L. 
Landrieu addressed the Senate Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery Hearing 
and stated that 56,668 residents of Louisiana still lived in temporary FEMA 
trailers. On July 10, 2007, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin reported to the United 
States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that 
there were still more than 150,000 residents who remain displaced by the storm. 
Disasters can last for several days; months, even years, and the impact to a 
community can last forever in several different ways. 
The role of mental health in the response and recovery phases of a 
disaster changed the view of many especially after 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. In 
both events the role of mental health started as supportive but because of the 
magnitude of these events their role evolved seamlessly into a long-term 
therapeutic role, eventually being overextended and overwhelmed. The botched 
response to Hurricane Katrina set the stage for a botched recovery, and the lack 
of permanent housing appeared to be the key element. Throughout the region 
there was loss of life, social disruption, property loss, and extensive damages 
that resulted in numerous adverse effects. A disaster was declared under The 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Assistance and Emergency Relief Act, long after the 
initial event had passed. Extraordinary circumstances forced relief measures to 
continue and yet even though housing assistance was extended several times, 
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each deadline that approached caused additional, compounded stress. The 
perceived insensitivity of the government to the basic sheltering needs of the 
victim dispels the belief of the victim and the public that there is a caring 
bureaucracy. Jobs were scarce, lives were disrupted, and relief was nowhere in 
sight--brutally highlighted as the media coverage to the general public 
continuously exposed the negligence of federal, state and local response to the 
situation. The traumatic conditions allowed for a social pathology that created 
new victims on a daily basis.  
The psychosocial consequences of disasters are frequently overlooked in 
the planning process.  However, they appear in the spotlight when an emergency 
becomes a catastrophe. Mental health concerns are underrepresented in the 
homeland security disaster planning and preparedness phases because they are 
primarily recovery functions, and thus invisible to responders. There lacks a 
connection to or feedback loop incorporating mental health services into the 
planning process. Once the immediate needs of the first responders are met, 
mental and public health workers are on their own, because Emergency 
Operation Centers (EOC) are demobilized and public and mental health workers 
left to operate within their normal span of resources. Emergency operation plans 
only address mental health functions that serve the purpose of the first 
responder. There continues to be limited effort to identify functions necessary to 
serve the needs of mental health and public health components during the 
recovery phase. The National Response Framework is expected to be the basis 
for all local emergency operations plans, and it deals exclusively with short term 
response and recovery. “Short-term recovery is immediate and overlaps with 
response. It includes actions such as providing essential public health and safety 
services, restoring interrupted utility and other essential services, reestablishing 
transportation routes, and providing food and shelter for those displaced by the 




Long-term recovery, which is outside the scope of the Framework, may involve 
some of the same actions but may continue for a number of months or years, 
depending on the severity and extent of the damage sustained.”59   
The lack of medical and public health resources creates a stress on the 
social fabric of the community particularly in the presence of so many other 
traumatic conditions. A detailed consequence assessment can work to create the 
short term and long term connection if experienced mental health and public 
health leaders are included in the planning phase. We need to realize that 
disasters cast a wide net--in addition to those directly affected by the disaster, 
victims can be first responders, witnesses (in person or media exposed), and 
almost anyone that feels some sort of a connection to the event. The 
psychological effects of a disaster can have both short and long term effects. 
Short term--sub clinical--effects can manifest in anxiety, sleep disorders, loss of 
concentration; these, however, are normal reactions to stress that dissipate in a 
matter of days or weeks. Longer-term effects do not dissipate but worsen, and 
are considered abnormal reactions. The unknown impact of post traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) symptoms that occur typically ninety days after an event persist 
indefinitely, exacerbated by a self medicating increase in drug and alcohol use. 
Emergency responders are familiar with Critical Incident Stress Management 
(CISM); assistance is immediate, but short term, much like their operational 
responses that usually have duration of forty-eight hours. This is similar to the 
forty-eight hour rule of thumb for catastrophes: you are on your own during the 
first forty-eight hours. The role of mental health is essentially irrelevant to first 
responders because the primary mental health role occurs after the initial 
response, well into the recovery period. 
The South Central Center for Public Health Preparedness presented a 
web cast entitled Two Years Later: Continued Psychological Difficulties of First 
Responders and the Affected General Population Post Katrina, and discussed 
                                            
59 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 45. 
 45
the social and mental health conditions that continued to afflict the victims of the 
hurricane. Symptoms of mental disorders were increasing rather than 
decreasing. A lack of preparedness is resulting in worsening conditions rather 
than an improving situation after two years and $85 billions of dollars in disaster 
relief. Not only does the report identify the glacial pace of the recovery efforts but 
it points to the fact that prior to the storm the area had the worst economic and 
health conditions among the general population in the entire country. These facts 
closely resemble a slow rolling disaster situation rather than a recovery effort. 
Was this a failure of response, planning or preparedness?  Answers to questions 
like this and lessons learned from disasters are two areas planners can apply in 
consequence assessments. New Orleans is a perfect example because the 
probable consequences of a catastrophic hurricane were well known to 
emergency response planners. If we as first responders fail to apply lessons 
learned, either from scenario exercises or real time events, the public will lose 
trust in our ability to provide emergency services and continue to question our 
practices, procedures and planning efforts.   
1. Taking Consequences Seriously 
It was July 2004 when the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) and emergency managers in southeast Louisiana conducted an exercise 
called Hurricane Pam, designed to assess the consequences of such a storm. 
This exercise was a departure from the normal plan-exercise cycle, when one 
develops a plan and designs an exercise to test the plan. Ironically, Hurricane 
Pam was designed to first identify the consequences of the disaster and then 
plan to respond to it. In his testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and 
government affairs Committee, Former FEMA-Louisiana Chief Sean R. Fontenot 
described his reaction to the exercise this way: “usually, you write a plan and 
then have an exercise. However, when it was explained to me that we were 
going to take an exercise scenario which generated real consequences and real 
data and bring operational level people in so they could make decisions using the 
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real data and consequences which could then drive the writing of a plan, I quickly 
got on board. I championed the fact that we were using operational people to 
write this plan because there are too many times plans are written without taking 
the operational aspects into account and this leads to non-usable plans.”60 The 
Hurricane Pam exercise was a logical departure from the usual plan-exercise 
cycle, except it yielded extremely accurate consequence projections.  
The design consultant for the exercise said, “We wanted to create a sense 
of realism in the exercise which generally does not inform a planning process 
when you are dealing with emergency planning. Because we are all mortal 
beings, we don’t like to look at the face of death and disaster, and most planning 
tends to look at the event that you can manage, not the events that you can’t 
manage. The Hurricane Pam exercise was designed with detailed consequences 
down to the parish level for each of these data elements. We actually had data 
on how many people would be affected by parish so that each of the individual 
parishes and the State and FEMA would have tactile information at their 
fingertips that they could use in planning.”61 Once the public became aware of 
this fact, fingers were pointing and the “being so surprised” attitude to this 
disaster was insulting to the residents of Louisiana. This is exactly the reason 
that when agencies exercise their plans it is critical to fix the issues revealed so 
that, at the very least, it can’t or won’t happen again. One can’t say that we didn’t 
know!  
Consequence assessment should be taken seriously; the public health 
sector knows this first hand while planning and preparing for a possible influenza 
pandemic. An example of planning by current methods might begin by expecting 
that during a pandemic of a highly pathogenic influenza, as many as one third of 
the residents of Union County, New Jersey will require medical care, which will 
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seriously overwhelm hospital surge capacity. This is qualitatively different from 
saying 130,000 people will need medical care even though we know there are 
less than 1600 hospital beds available at full surge capacity. The first statement 
is vague enough to allow a planner to consider that the problem will have a 
resolution. The second statement allows no such delusion. Another example is to 
say that an anthrax attack against Atlantic City, New Jersey will result in great 
loss of life and serious economic costs in the first seven days. This statement is 
not as instructive to HLS planners as saying that 33,000 people will die and 
another 22,000 will require medical care costing $326.7 million, there will be 
210,675 years of potential life lost, over $26.2 billion actuarial losses, 50,000 jobs 
lost, $734,000 loss of state and federal income tax losses, $874,000 in other lost 
tax revenues and a loss of $4,380,000 per day in sales of goods and services to 
the casino industry.62 When the simple consequence statement is replaced with 
a quantitative statement of the losses, the practicality of mitigation and 
preparedness is difficult to miss. It is important to note that there are few 
defensive options available to local planners to either of the above examples, but 
the preparedness and mitigation efforts for both scenarios are nearly identical. In 
these two cases, preparedness and mitigation efforts would have dual-use 
functionality as well as day-to-day utility.63 This is an advantage that a 
comprehensive consequence assessment can provide planners; it can suggest 
mitigation measures that will reduce consequences and build resilience while 
reducing risk.  
D. ELEMENTS OF CONSEQUENCE 
September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina were incidents that taught us 
many things about consequences and the difficult road to recovery. Despite the 
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relatively small geographic footprint of the World Trade Center attack, there was 
approximately $94 billion in estimated loss with economic ripples felt well beyond 
New York City.64 Katrina, on the other hand, devastated an area roughly the size 
of Great Britain, and after more than two years, and despite more than $30 billion 
in federal relief, significant problems still exist in areas like New Orleans and 
Gulfport-Biloxi.65 Studies on the aftermath of Katrina and the 9/11 attacks reveal 
many sources of information quantifying consequences that were previously 
overlooked. Impacts of Katrina to housing, industrial output, employment, travel 
and tourism, energy, import-export, gaming, fisheries and federal aid are well 
documented from data collected routinely by the federal government. If these 
elements were incorporated into the risk assessment process we would have a 
much clearer idea about the real cost of consequences and what vulnerability 
reduction measures cost in terms of lost opportunity to reduce consequences.  
The Census Bureau website66 is an important source of critical information 
including individual and family income, housing descriptions and median values 
as well as employment status. The Census Bureau also has economic and 
business data broken out by zip code for eight business sectors, which 
encompass about 60% of the businesses that have employees. The American 
Fact Finder feature can sort out business information by annual net proceeds so 
that the impact of a business disruption can be estimated. Census Bureau 
County Business Patterns provides data on establishments that include 
employment numbers, first quarter and annual payrolls. This can help planners 
predict the volume of unemployment claims due to employer closures, or loss of 
business due to travel restrictions, illness, etc. The U.S. Commerce Department, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis has regional economic information that includes 
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income by county, unemployment, dividends, etc.67 The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics has a wide array of data on all aspects of employment broken out 
geographically and by North American Industry Classification System 
identification number. 
A study conducted one year after 9/11 by the Comptroller of New York 
City showed the value of locally collected data. The report examines six (6) 
categories of economic factors that adversely impacted the City. These include:  
• Lost wealth – property and human potential 
• Lost gross city product including lost jobs  
• Tax revenue lost 
• Increased expenditures 
• Unexpected capital costs 
• Impact of federal assistance68  
The report also projects anticipated future losses based on economic growth 
prior to the attack, the immediate losses experienced in the attack, and the 
projected economic rebound after the attack. This report shows how much can 
be brought into the consequence assessment process if the planner takes the 
time to build out the scenario.  
Congress established the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund 
(VCF), after the 9/11/ attacks to compensate those who were seriously injured or 
killed in the attack. The VCF is a unique loss category of the 9/11 attacks, but it is 
one that will arise in future terrorist attacks and must be considered in future 
consequence assessments. Although individual cases are not open to the public, 
we know that:  
Almost all civilians who were killed or seriously injured in the 9/11 
attacks decided to file claims with the VCF. Awards from the VCF 
ranged from $250,000 to $7.1 million and averaged $2.08 million. 
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Quantified benefits for the 2,551 killed and 215 seriously injured 
totaled $8.7 billion, or an average of $3.1 million per recipient, with 
69 percent of total benefits coming from the VCF, 23 percent from 
insurance, and 8 percent from charity.69 
With payouts to family members of victims averaging $2.08 million dollars, the 
cost of successful future terrorist attacks has increased significantly.70 Cost is the 
universal parameter for loss, and planners must account for as many costs as 
possible while conducting a consequence assessment.  
The planner must ask questions concerning the geographical footprint of 
the incident. Within that footprint he/she will need to know the population 
characteristics; number of people in the area; if that population changes 
significantly by time of day; loss of income impact; and type of businesses. Who 
will be impacted by the loss of product? How much time to return to normalcy? 
What is the impact to the local economy and the regional economy of the 
disruption? Other criteria’s in a consequence assessment include real estate 
uses (residential, industrial, commercial); the nature of public property (are 
response assets located within the footprint, delaying response, i.e., hospitals, 
fire stations, EMS units?). What is the value or replacement cost of property 
impacted by the incident?  
Casualty estimates are another area that planners have to address. The 
Centers for Disease Control have several sites that can assist planners to 
estimate the numbers and type of casualties to expect from an incident. The 
Mass Casualty Predictor71 provides information useful to estimate hospital 
utilization. From this site there are links to more specific pages that list common 
bacteriological and chemical agents, their effects and common medical 
management recommendations, as well as a mental health estimator. There are 
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also links to pages that contain radiological exposure and treatment information 
as well as pages that give background information on blast injuries and 
treatments based on actual terrorist incidents. Types of injuries and medical 
management recommendations can serve as the basis for cost of treatment 
projections for the estimated casualties. Medicare, Medicaid and private medical 
insurers all have Usual and Customary Rates (UCR) and Allowable Charge 
figures for various treatments. Mining the data from known disasters and pairing 
them with cost of treatment estimates can give cost of treatment averages for 
various types of injuries or estimates can be attempted from recommendations 
for medical management paired to UCR’s from regional health insurers. These 
costs have to be considered when policy makers are deciding where to invest 
Homeland Security funds. The more accurate the consequence assessment 
becomes the better policymakers can determine the cost effectiveness of 
security measures.  
This chapter illustrated the importance of understanding the complexity of 
consequences. It revealed how relevant federal guidance documents focus on 
short term, response oriented issues, lowering the planning horizon and thus 
limiting our ability to improve response to incidents to only incremental 
improvements. This shortcoming is very evident looking at the medical and 
mental health recovery from Hurricane Katrina. After two years and billions of 
dollars the psychosocial fabric of the Gulf Coast community is still tearing. This 
demonstrates that incremental improvements are ineffective when emergencies 
become catastrophes. We need resources in scale with the problems they 
trigger. When we are caught unprepared, local government specifically and all 
levels of government generally, lose the confidence of the public.   
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V. CULTURE OF PREPAREDNESS 
In this chapter Post 9/11 responders are discussed in relation to the 
various new disciplines that are involved in emergency response and in the 
complexity of today’s responses. As the new and traditional disciplines develop 
stronger relationships there will be a foundation for a true culture of 
preparedness. The Black Swan phenomenon reveals that despite federal 
guidance for critical infrastructure protection, it is impossible to predict low 
probability, high consequence incidents, but it is not impossible to predict their 
effects. By utilizing consequence assessment we can begin to prepare for the 
next Black Swan. In building resilience, the importance of the all-hazards 
approach to preparedness is discussed and how the trust of the public relies on a 
prepared government. 
A. POST 911 RESPONDER 
Preparedness is “the range of deliberate critical tasks and activities 
necessary to build, sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, 
protect against, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. Preparedness 
is a continuous process involving efforts at all levels of government and between 
government and private sector and nongovernmental organizations to identify 
threats, determine vulnerabilities, and identify required activities and resources to 
mitigate risk.”72 And although these principles have been used to justify 
defensive and response based options, they are clearly meant to stimulate 
alternative strategies to the familiar “guns, gates and gadgets” approach. 
Observing the response to Hurricane Katrina on the Fox and CNN news outlets 
brought to mind the question, “How could a news crew gain access to the city of 
New Orleans when emergency responders could not?” The main lesson learned 
is the need to develop and foster a transformation to a “culture of preparedness.” 
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There continues to be an overwhelming “it can’t or won’t happen here” attitude 
among local emergency management and/or or local policy makers. This is 
supported by the Nationwide Plan Review Phase II Report which stated that 
“twenty-one percent of State plans and 9% of urban area plans were rated as 
Sufficient in terms of feasibility; this corresponds to a prevailing belief discounting 
the likelihood of catastrophes.”73 The post 9/11 responder has to recognize the 
probability of an incident of national significance will happen again. There is no 
part of the country immune from a devastating natural disaster. “While Hurricane 
Katrina was devastating, catastrophe modelers have identified a number of 
possible natural disasters that could be much worse. Among these extreme 
events would be a repeat of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake with potential 
damages estimates reaching $400 billion; a repeat of the 1900 Galveston 
hurricane with $36 billion in possible damages; a repeat of the 1938 Category 3 
hurricane that hit the Northeast with possible damages exceeding $300 billion; 
or, a repeat of the series of earthquakes that struck the New Madrid Fault in 1811 
and 1812 with potential economic damages of up to $275 billion with insured 
losses reaching $100 billion. All of these and many more scenarios are possible. 
Should any one of them occur, we are unprepared to deal with the aftermath of 
an event of this magnitude.”74 Post 9/11 responders must prepare for highly 
complex response scenarios by collaborating with other disciplines and the public 
and the private sector.  
Within the emergency management culture are long standing biases 
toward response rather than mitigation, which was clearly illustrated in the NRF’s 
distinction between short term response and long term recovery. This collective 
denial inhibits any transformation to a culture of preparedness and promotes a 
conflation of preparedness and readiness. Responders need to know how and 
where to go for additional resources once they hit their breaking point. Without an 
                                            
73 Nationwide Plan Review Phase II, 62. Nationwide Plan Review: Phase 2 Report, US Dept 
of Homeland Security, June 2006. 
74 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Natural Catastrophe Risk: Creating a 
Comprehensive National Plan, NAIC, (draft document, 2007), 1. 
 55
awareness of the probable consequences of an incident they can neither 
accurately gauge level of preparedness nor identify resources necessary to 
mitigate the impact. Critical to every response is the interval of time between 
being reactive and becoming proactive. It is in this transition phase that 
responders have the ability to keep an emergency from becoming a disaster. The 
faster responders become proactive the closer they are to entering the recovery 
phase. Aware that human vulnerability exacerbated by the lack of planning or 
lack of appropriate emergency management can lead to financial, structural, and 
human losses, it is critical for responders to respond proactively before the 
damage of events spirals out of control.  
Prior to September 11, 2001, there was a “response as usual” attitude 
among first responders, and on that very day the lack of a culture of 
preparedness among emergency responders was highlighted and has affected 
the way first responders plan, prepare and respond to any disaster today. Most 
local emergency management organizations were traditionally under funded 
and/or suffering from dual use positions. For example, “two decades of taxpayer 
rebellion have stripped away the means necessary for government workers to 
provide help during emergencies. Most city and state public health and 
emergency-management departments are not funded adequately enough for 
them to carry out even their routine work.”75 Another example is that it was not 
uncommon for the police or fire chief to also act as the emergency management 
director. The response to Hurricane Floyd in 1999 raised serious questions about 
North Carolina’s preparedness and ability to deal with large-scale disasters due 
to the slowness of the emergency response, the heavy loss of life and the 
inability to conduct pre-planning. “Local emergency operation centers (EOC) 
[that] were always used to dealing serially with small-scale incidents like car 
wrecks and lost person searches were unable to handle a large number of 
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simultaneous incidents. Managers had no training in dealing with floods or large-
scale incidents, and the state, which could have provided the needed expertise, 
adopted a passive, hands off attitude as they attempted to solve each problem as 
it came up.”76 Response was business as usual in that emergency management 
directed operations, police directed traffic, firefighters and public works pulled 
individuals out of the water, and public health officials focused on environmental 
health and surveillance of disease/injury.  
National Strategy for Homeland Security identified that the culture of 
preparedness relies on four principles. “The first principle of our Culture of 
Preparedness is a shared acknowledgement that creating a prepared Nation will 
be an enduring challenge.”77 The second principle is the importance of individual 
and collective initiative to counter fundamental biases toward reactive responses 
and approaches. Our culture, therefore, must encourage and reward innovation 
and new ways of thinking as well as better align authority and responsibility so 
that those who are responsible for a mission or task have the authority to act.78 
The third principle is that individual citizens, communities, the private sector, and 
non-profit organizations each perform a central role in homeland security.79 The 
fourth principle of our Culture of Preparedness is the responsibility of each level 
of government in fostering a prepared Nation.80 Developing a culture of 
preparedness is very different from preventive and defensive strategies; they are 
true preparedness and mitigation based approaches to catastrophic problems. 
They concern the government’s ability to provide essential services in emergency 
conditions and measures to minimize impacts of any major incident that occurs. 
Today’s responders have a whole new set of priorities, with different 
professional cultures being thrown into the mix, such as public health and health 
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care agencies. The main challenge is that these public health agencies are more 
planning oriented by comparison, hopelessly understaffed, have a completely 
different set of response priorities, and have rarely ever trained with other 
responders such as emergency management, police and fire officials. Due to the 
required interaction of unfamiliar agencies and disciplines, it is clear that 
responses have become much more complex, necessitating the development of 
plans such as the National Response Framework and the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS). Emergency response now looks more like a 
modern military Distributed Operations model than the antiquated phalanx 
formation. 
Moving closer to a cultural change within emergency management will 
require a paradigm shift that casts all players, new and traditional responders, 
into the same mix. Preparedness must emphasize the shared nature of 
responsibilities in a catastrophic event. The shared nature of responsibilities 
requires us to “develop a shared vision of our commitment to preparedness: what 
we must do to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from the next 
catastrophe.”81 A new trust has to be established among people and agencies 
that have little or no experience working together. Cultural institutions and 
artifacts have to be broken down and reformed. This approach will require that 
players recognize the shared nature of responsibility in planning and response. 
Comprehensive consequence assessments can provide a means to visualize a 
disaster and illustrate the shared relationships and responsibilities. Exercises are 
another way to accomplish this transformation. Plan revisions after exercises can 
help to align plans to human and physical assets; align authority to 
responsibilities; align expectations to capabilities; and, integrate and synchronize 
our policies, strategies and plans. If this is to be successful, however, it is 
necessary for policy makers to clearly separate plan failure from individual or 
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agency failure. Removal of blame removes the pressure of failure, creating an 
environment that encourages innovation and is conducive to improvement.  
Instead of defining failure as an unsuccessful attempt at doing something, 
it should be redefined as inaction or resistance to change within agencies 
unwilling to plan, trust, reform and exercise as a unit. A culture of preparedness 
will incorporate a shared vision of readiness, cooperation, capability, innovation 
and trust. These cultural shifts defy analytical enumeration but can be used as 
indicators to know whether we are achieving success by observation of 
increased cooperation, decreased competition and increased communication 
(formal and informal) among response agencies and personnel. These informal 
indices are the necessary precursors to build in collaborative capacity.  
B. BLACK SWAN PHENOMENON 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, author of The Black Swan, writes about how we 
process information, avoid risks, and fall into traps based on false assumptions 
concerning probability and possibility. His concepts have application to homeland 
security in that he argues that it is futile to use a risk based approach to predict 
something that is unforeseen. He says that “we can have a clear idea of the 
consequences of an event even if we do not know how likely it is to occur. I don’t 
know the odds of an earthquake, but I can imagine how San Francisco might be 
affected by one. This idea that in order to make a decision you need to focus on 
the consequences (which you can know) rather than the probability (which you 
can’t know) is the central idea of uncertainty.”82 The events of 9/11, Hurricane 
Katrina and the recent sub-prime mortgage collapse are all examples of black 
swans. The theory is that a black swan possesses three attributes. First, it is an 
outlier in that it lies outside the realm of regular expectations because nothing in 
the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it carries an extreme 
impact. Finally, in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct 
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explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and 
predictable. A black swan is the triplet of being a rarity, having extreme impact, 
and retrospectively predictable.83  
Black swans are the high consequence/low probability events that are 
feared by preparedness planners. It was not until after the attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon that the signs and signals observed prior to the 
attack made sense and eventually led the 9/11 Commission to lament the “failure 
of imagination” and the “failure to connect the dots.”  The devastation of the 
broken levees, the botched response and the equally botched recovery in 
Hurricane Katrina are examples of events that were completely unexpected in 
the richest, most powerful nation in the world. It is interesting that in an industry 
that relies so heavily on risk and probability models to minimize loss that the 
collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market and the cascade effect on the world 
economy was completely unexpected by everyone except Taleb. The point is--
Black Swans are mega-catastrophes and they are occurring with greater 
frequency. The problem is–-planning, responding, and dealing with it! 
C. BUILDING RESILIENCE  
Resilience has become the buzz word of choice in homeland security 
circles. Resilience broadly defined is the ability of a system to withstand and 
recover from adversity.84 Emergency response is the ability to react to an 
incident, protect life and property to the greatest extent possible, stabilize the 
situation and pave the way for the recovery effort. September 11, 2001 and 
Hurricane Katrina were incidents that taught us many things about consequences 
and the difficult road to recovery. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to 
absorb a shock without interruption or to bounce back quickly from a potentially 
fatal blow. Stephen Flynn ascribes four attributes to resilience that describe how 
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resilience affects a system. He writes: First, there is robustness - the ability to 
keep operating or to stay standing in the face of disaster.85 Second is 
resourcefulness, which involves skillfully managing a disaster once it unfolds.  
The third element of resilience is rapid recovery, which is the capacity to 
get things back to normal as quickly as possible after a disaster. Carefully drafted 
contingency plans, competent emergency operations, and the means to get the 
right people and resources to the right places are crucial. Finally, resilience 
means having the means to absorb the new lessons that can be drawn from a 
catastrophe.86 These attributes can only be achieved if planners are aware of 
what is likely to occur in an incident, and how adverse events can be avoided. In 
short, they need to have thought through the possible consequences; identified 
key resources; informed all key players; and, have built in redundancies or 
sufficient reserve capacity to maintain critical functions.   
It is important for communities to build their preparedness level because of 
the nature of recent and most likely future disasters. “The United States is 
becoming a brittle nation. An increasingly urbanized and suburbanized 
population has embraced just-in-time lifestyles tethered to ATM machines and 
24-hour stores that provide instant access to cash, food, and gas. When the 
power goes out and these modern conveniences fail, Americans are 
incapacitated.”87 We know that our power grid has inherent weaknesses. We 
know that we are highly dependent on foreign energy sources imported from 
countries that are less than strong allies. Our “just in time” supply chain has 
depleted our reserve capacity in every area. We are vulnerable to more and 
various interruptions and failures than ever before. Resiliency needs to be built  
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on a personal, community and regional basis. Well synthesized by The United 
States Fire Administration are three characteristics of a resilient community and 
are as follows:   
• Identify and comprehend the multiple vulnerabilities to all hazards 
resulting from the interdependencies among the departments, 
agencies, corporations, industries, and organizations that comprise 
the public and private sectors of a community.  
• Meticulously assess the probable consequences of all hazards 
considering the identified vulnerabilities and the cascading effects 
of a disaster among all community service providers.  
• Develop a community security plan that eliminates vulnerabilities 
and mitigates predicted consequences to ensure stakeholder 
functions can be quickly restored after an incident and the 
community can return to normal operations as soon as possible.88 
The key to building a resilient community is the ability to comprehend the 
risks facing it. Comprehension denotes a keen understanding of the risk that 
includes knowledge of the weaknesses inherent in the infrastructures and how 
they are vulnerable to various hazards. Comprehension of the risk facilitates the 
development of continuity plans that in turn rely on regional, interdisciplinary 
planning and protective measures that include defensive measures, redundancy 
and mitigation measures. When discussing the long term social and 
psychological effects of Hurricane Katrina, Dr. C.J. Davis, State Planner from 
The Mississippi Office of Emergency Planning and Response and the Mental 
Health Liaison to the Mississippi Department of Health, enumerated the crime, 
drug abuse, mental health challenges, and pathology found in temporary housing 
trailer compounds two years after the hurricane and said, “We didn’t visualize 
this.”89  
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Achieving resilience is a goal that requires a comprehensive, all-hazards, 
cross-sector, grass roots-to-national level integrated approach. Resilience 
requires both horizontal and vertical cooperation and coordination of key public, 
private, and non-profit stakeholders that have responsibilities or vested interests 
in improving regional preparedness.90 A thorough and comprehensive 
consequence assessment will enhance these resilience building measures and 
facilitate comprehension. Illuminating the chain of events that are likely to occur 
and revealing the interdependencies among response disciplines will facilitate 
cross jurisdictional horizontal and vertical integration. We can’t forget that 
response and recovery will ultimately depend upon a foundation of trust in 
government. The ability to re-establish a sense of normalcy depends on a trust 
factor among communities, responders and political governments. It is the speed 
with which we return to normal that measures our resilience. A prime example of 
speedy recovery is the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks. Even though 
the destruction was a national trauma, New York City returned relatively quickly 
to normalcy because the City of New York maintained a high level of 
preparedness. The people of New York refused to give in to the situation 
because Mayor Giuliani–-known as “America’s mayor” because of his leadership-
-showed the same emotions as those hit hard, and in return, he was trusted and 
praised for his close involvement with the rescue and recovery efforts. 
In light of the increasing complexity of today’s emergency responses, 
planning is critical today. Both traditional and non-traditional responders must 
work together to develop a culture of preparedness. The higher level of 
preparedness is particularly important to respond to the Black Swan events. 
Hurricane Katrina and 9/11 can certainly be categorized as black swans because 
they were unpredictable with high impact.  
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The argument of this thesis has been that the current risk assessment 
method discourages local governments from carefully considering consequence 
as an equal part of the risk based equation in protecting their hometowns. Local 
emergency managers are concerned with ground level issues. They see the 
consequences of incidents in human terms. Yet they are forced to mold their 
efforts to conform to federal guidance that is really geared to the 30,000-foot 
view. Until a thorough understanding of the consequences of an incident is 
considered and the funding allocation formula revised, local homeland security 
preparedness efforts will be incomplete at best.  
There is limited funding available to local government to defend an 
unlimited number of targets by applying a risk-based approach that favors 
defensive tactics over mitigation. Making incremental improvements to respond 
to or defend against the potentially catastrophic threat is not good enough 
anymore. There needs to be a consistent method for assessing risk at the local 
level–-one that lessens the impact of the attack or disaster by equally considering 
threat, vulnerability, and consequence during the assessment process.  
Consequences are in fact a complex series of events that are difficult, but 
not impossible, to envision if the potential incident is carefully thought out during 
planning. Ironically, Hurricane Katrina provides a perfect example of planning for 
the worst consequences. New Orleans’ exercise in 2004, known as Hurricane 
Pam, identified many of the needs and lessons to reduce the eventual impact of 
a real catastrophe. Unfortunately, agencies and leaders failed to implement many 
of the lessons. By performing a comprehensive consequence assessment we 
can raise our planning horizon, tell the story of the disaster in a safe 
environment, identify the necessary resources to reduce an impact, and build the 
interdisciplinary and interagency relationships required in forming a culture of  
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preparedness. Should we opt out of taking time to assess consequences during 
the planning process, Fox News and CNN will be sure to show them to us and to 
the rest of the world during and after an incident.  
Since the inception of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, 
billions of dollars have been invested in projects with little relation to national 
security. The RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy has found 
that 95% of terrorism risk is concentrated in eight urban areas. The funding 
strategy is based on marginal improvement of response capability and defensive 
measures for targets under no threat. This undermines our ability to build the 
capacity that we need to reduce the number of victims of the next disaster that 
we know will come. In addition to the strategic shortcomings of our homeland 
security grant programs, every random audit of state grant performance 
uncovered problems stemming from faulty management, dubious targeting of 
expenditures and/or questionable spending problems.  
Disaster planning can also benefit greatly from a comprehensive 
consequence assessment. The consequence assessment can paint a picture 
that informs responders and agencies involved in recovery of what to expect, and 
guide preparedness planning in measures aimed at reducing loss of lives and 
property. This effort is thwarted, however, by DHS guidance that focuses on 
short term or defensive options rather than on mitigation plans capable of 
lessening the impact of an incident. The National Response Framework, for 
example, is intended for short term planning purposes, or as the title indicates, a 
response framework. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) focuses 
on defensive options for critical infrastructure/key resources (CI/KR). The key 
word here is protection. 
The National Preparedness Guidelines, on the other hand, professes to 
address both long and short-term preparedness by including a list of Target 
Capabilities and utilizing a set of Universal Tasks everyone is expected to apply 
in the planning process. Instead of encouraging a comprehensive planning 
process, these documents are overwhelming and confusing to a planner. Then 
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there is the National Strategy for Homeland Security that sets out a plan to 
prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks, to protect people and CI/KR, and to respond 
and recover from incidents. The Strategy admits that recovery is an enormous 
task but one that can be ameliorated by preparedness and developing a new 
culture of preparedness.  
The national strategy lists four elements of the culture of preparedness. 
Three of the elements in the strategy are assigned to individuals and the private 
sector. The fourth charges all levels of government to embrace in partnership.91 
There is a subtle but important difference in the description of the culture of 
preparedness between the National Strategy and The Federal Response to 
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. The Katrina report identified the high 
priority of this critical need, stating that “a new preparedness culture must 
emphasize that the entire Nation—Federal, State, and local governments; the 
private sector; communities; and individual citizens—shares common goals and 
responsibilities for homeland security. In other words, our homeland security is 
built upon a foundation of partnership.”92 Here the leadership role of the federal 
government is evident in fostering the partnership. Disaster planning, led by a 
comprehensive consequence assessment, can provide the link between cause 
and effect, and between the public and private resources required by the culture 
of preparedness.  
Developing a culture of preparedness must begin with the first responder 
communities as they begin to develop, trust and nurture new relationships within 
and among dissimilar agencies under the common cause of saving lives. New 
trust has to be established as unfamiliar partners begin to rely on each other to 
accomplish their mission. The more new partners participate in assessing 
consequences the easier it will be to recognize the inter-relationships and inter-
dependencies that will either make or break the recovery from a disaster. 
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A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since September 11, 2001 this country has spent, on average, $282 
millions per day on the “Global War on Terror.”93 Most of the expenditure has 
been on the war in Iraq. We need to take a few days off from war and 
concentrate on the home front by increasing our resilience. The resilience of this 
nation is dependent upon the strength found in each of us as citizens and the 
preparedness of our governments.  
DHS must direct as much attention on preparedness issues as it has on 
response and vulnerability reduction. Strong guidance on consequence 
assessment will aid local governments in developing the local resources 
necessary to build preparedness. Our present strategy relies on multi-hazard 
reduction instead of all-hazard preparedness. We can no longer depend on the 
leadership of September 10th to protect us in the future. We need to upgrade the 
local emergency management leadership to match the increasing complexity that 
true preparedness requires. Local emergency management directors should be 
full time federally funded employees assigned to a local jurisdiction. Critical 
Infrastructure Protection should be focused on sector wide faults and be the 
responsibility of the federal government. Local efforts should be focused on 
preparedness, specifically fostering the culture of preparedness and building 
resilience.  
B. COMMENTARY 
It is time to end reliance on expensive outside contractors with limited or 
no local situational knowledge or experience needed to augment local 
preparedness. Many disciplines suffer from manpower shortages; these areas 
will require substantial, long term federal funding to expand and maintain the total 
workforce. Better training of the existing workforce is not the panacea for 
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disciplines like public health and mental health. A ten percent increase in 
productivity in a field that needs to double its workforce just to meet routine 
operations is an incremental improvement that is insignificant in every condition. 
DHS has not asked its original workforce to do the expanded roles it has 
acquired. When intelligence needed to be analyzed, analysts were hired. When 
airports needed security, new security was hired. As the border needs patrolling, 
new officers are being hired. State and local governments do not have the ability 
to hire new staff for HLS roles. This is a serious handicap that must be 
addressed. Brand new equipment in the hands of the same old short staff will not 
improve response capability. There is a wealth of knowledge, dedication and 
resourcefulness resident in local agencies that need only the time and support to 
perform the critical tasks that lie ahead. We need to scale the workforce to the 
new role. The belief that incremental improvements to response will somehow 
reduce consequences more than just incrementally is madness not worthy of the 
American people.  
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